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Abstract—Assisting traffic control is one of the most important
applications on Internet of Vehicles (IoVs). Traffic information
provided by vehicles is desired since drivers or vehicle sensors are
sensitive in perceiving or detecting nuances on roads. However,
the availability and privacy-preservation of this information are
critical while conflicted with each other in vehicular commu-
nication. In this paper, we propose a semi-centralized mode
with attribute-based blockchain in IoVs to balance the trade-
off between the availability and the privacy-preservation. In this
mode, a method of control-by-vehicles is used to control signals
of traffic lights to increase traffic efficiency. Users are grouped
their attributes like locations and directions before starting the
communication. The users reach an agreement on determining a
temporary signal timing by interacting with each other without
leaking privacy. Final decisions are verifiable to all users, even if
they have no a priori agreement and processes of consensus. The
mode not only achieves the aim of privacy-preservation but also
supports responsibility investigation for historical agreements
via ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption and blockchain
technology. Extensive experimental results demonstrated that our
mode is efficient and practical.
Index Terms—attribute-based encryption, blockchain, privacy
preserving, internet of vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET of vehicles (IoVs) has become one of the mea-sures to ease traffic congestion in cities. Traffic information
is automatically collected, disposed and broadcasted through
IoVs for traffic condition prediction, traffic accident detection,
and efficient service deliverie.
Current projects [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] relied on the capture
of vehicle information to deal with traffic problems, instead
The work reported in this paper was supported in part by National Key
R&D Program of China, under grant 2017YFB0802805, in part by Natural
Science Foundation of China, under Grant U1736114 and 61672092, and in
part by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China
under Grants 2018JBZ103.
L. Cheng, J. Liu and W. Wang are with Beijing Key Laboratory of
Security and Privacy in Intelligent Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong Univer-
sity, Beijing 100044, China (e-mail: lccheng@bjtu.edu.cn; jqliu@bjtu.edu.cn;
wangwei1@bjtu.edu.cn).
G. Xu is with Tianjin Key Laboratory of Advanced Networking (TANK),
College of Intelligence and Computing, Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300350,
China (e-mail: losin@tju.edu.cn).
Z. Zhang is with IMT Lille Douai, Institut Mines-Tlcom, 59650,
Villeneuve-dAscq, France (e-mail: zonghua.zhang@imt-lille-douai.fr).
H. Wang is with Department of Computer Science, Norwegian University
of Science and Technology, Norway (e-mail: hawa@ntnu.no).
H. Dai is with Faculty of Information Technology, Macau University of
Science and Technology, Macau (e-mail: hndai@ieee.org).
Y. Wu is with Department of Computer Science, College of Engineer-
ing, Mathematics and Physical Sciences, University of Exeter, Harrison
Building, North Park Road, Exeter, EX4 4QF, United Kingdom (e-mail:
y.l.wu@exeter.ac.uk).
W. Wang is the corresponding author.
of the information provided by vehicles. Let vehicles generate
and broadcast messages about traffic information; this brings
advantages to intelligent transportation since drivers are able
to perceive tiny but essential traffic information compared with
infrastructures like detection devices. However, in the process
of capturing vehicle information, preserving the privacy of
road users is less considered, such as driving habits and
vehicles trajectories.
Researchers in academia preferred to use announcement
protocols in vehicle ad-hoc networks (VANETs), inter-vehicle
communication (IVC) or internet of vehicles (IoVs) to realize
an interaction among vehicles, aiming at bypassing congestion
roads and avoiding accidents. In [6], three necessary standards
of messages are given, including message integrity, legitimate
generation, and reliability measurement.
In this work, we introduced a semi-centralized traffic signal
control mode (SCTSC mode) with attribute-based blockchain
in IoVs for signalized intersections. Different from pre-timed
modes and actuated modes, our mode dynamically modifies
signal timing based on inputs received from vehicles and an
attribute-based blockchain, which is not affected by environ-
mental conditions and strict device installation requirements.
Vehicles are divided into groups implicitly and dynamically
by their dynamic attributes (e.g., locations and directions).
Each vehicle votes to reach a temporary agreement of sig-
nal timing change encrypted by ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption in its group. The temporary agreement and
messages of agreement rounds are recorded on an attribute-
based blockchain as records. Traffic signal controllers and
participants (e.g., users in other groups and bystanders) are
able to get and verify final decisions of temporary agreements
without the leakage of drivers’ privacy.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We proposed a semi-centralized traffic signal control
mode (SCTSC mode) with attribute based blockchain
in IoVs. The mode realizes an efficient dynamic traffic
signal control from a novel method of control by vehicles.
• To the best of our knowledge, the attribute-based
blockchain that we constructed in our mode is the
first blockchain structure that supports fine-grained non-
interactive access control on traffic data. The blockchain
is tamper resistance. Data is generated and recorded in
groups. Some part of data is transparent while others
is only readable for those who have access (a proper
attribute set).
• SCTSC mode achieves a balance between privacy-
preservation and availability of information. Users are
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anonymous in the mode. Temporary agreements and
agreement rounds’ messages in a group are recorded on
an attribute-based blockchain. Contents of the agreements
and messages are unreadable by other users or groups.
However, final decisions of signal timing change are
readable and verifiable to traffic signal controllers and
all users. Moreover, Authentication Centers and Trace
Managers are used to authenticate users’ real identities
beforehand, trace malicious users, and investigate ma-
licious users’ accountability. Standards of message in-
tegrity, legitimate generation, and reliability measurement
are also required.
• The SCTSC mode is more efficient for a non-traffic-heavy
road compared with the pre-timed modes, since it allows
vehicles to pass quickly. The novel mode is more stable
than actuated modes, since it is less likely to be affected
by weather or overweight trucks.
• Each phase of SCTSC mode was simulated. Experimental
results showed that the mode is efficient and practical in
a real situation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces related works. In Section III, a framework of
SCTSC mode is briefly described from problem description,
attribute-based blockchain, and roles. Each phase of the mode
is introduced in Section IV, while a concrete instantiation
of the mode with complex formulas is given in Appendices
A. Section V analyzes security and simulation results of the
mode. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Announcement Protocol
Announcement protocol allows infrastructures and vehicles
to generate and broadcast messages in VANETs. With attach-
ing importance to privacy[7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13],
[14], [15], [16], [17], novel protocols devoted to finding a
trade-off between availability and privacy preservation.
Some researchers used threshold method to satisfy the stan-
dards. Ref. [18] achieved targets of threshold authentication
by using group signature scheme. Based on identity-based
aggregate signature, [19] and [20] proposed efficient secure
and privacy-preserving authentication scheme in VANETs.
However, they did not consider the case of long-term respon-
sibility investigation. If an effect caused by a fake message
appears far after the communication stage, because of a
negative recording of message in vehicles and instruments,
the investigation scheme is not usable.
Trust-based method and reputation-based method were also
used in research. Ref. [21] designed Dempster-Shafter theory,
reputation algorithm, and message forwarding criterion to
evaluate the reliability of messages broadcasted in VANETs.
Ref. [22] used Dempster-Shafer theory to evaluate a trust
level of location findings. Based on Bayesian filter, a robust
distributed reputation model was proposed in [23]. ARS[24]
used pseudonyms and reputation levels to construct a central-
ized reputation system for VANETs. Hidden markov model
(HMM) was used in [25] to build a reputation computation
mechanism. However, trust-based and reputation-based meth-
ods have difficulty in dealing with Sybil attack, if an adversary
has pretended to enhance his or her reputation. Creditcoin [26]
combined credit with transaction and coin damping. In this
way, Sybil attack is prevented. But, transaction records can
be read by anyone, consequently leading to a risk of privacy
leakage.
B. Blockchain technology
In 2008, Satoshi used a hash chain and proof of work
in Bitcoin [27]. The technology that is drawn from Bitcoin
is known as Blockchain Technology, or Distributed Ledger
Technology (DLT).
A blockchain is a tamper-resistant data chain ordered by
data blocks. Block contains a data area and a pointer to a
previous block. The data area is used to store data (e.g.,
transactions). The pointer is used to guarantee the order among
blocks and tamper-resistance. A variety of works about the
blockchain network has been done in [28], [29], [30], [31].
Zerocoin [32] and Zerocash [33] are decentralized anony-
mous payment systems from Bitcoin. These payment systems
used zero-knowledge proof to protect users’ privacy. Ripple
improved the consensus algorithm and proposed RPCA based
on UNLs. Constructions in [34] and [35] realized Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) on blockchain to trace operations and
change public keys. However, in present projects, data stored
on the blockchain was either public to anyone or only available
to the owner. Fine-Grained access control on data was missing.
C. Attribute-based encryption
Sahai and Waters proposed fuzzy identity based encryption
[36] on the basic of identity based encryption (IBE)[37][38]
in 2005. Goyal gave a concept and definition of attribute-
based encryption [39]. Attribute-based encryption supports
fine-grained non-interactive access control inherently. Only the
user whose attribute set conforms to an access control policy
has the right to access the decrypt data and get plaintext. In
attribute-based encryption, enciphers do not need to focus on
identities or the number of ciphertext receivers. In this way, the
cost of encryption is decreased, and a flexible access control
policy is provided.
Due to the differences in access control policies, attribute-
based encryption consists of ciphertext policy attribute-based
encryption (CP-ABE) [40] and key policy attribute-based
encryption (KP-ABE) [41]. Access control policies in CP-ABE
are related to ciphertexts, while keys are related to attribute
sets. However, for KP-ABE, access control policies are keys
correlation, while attributes set are ciphertexts correlation.
The algorithm in [42] realized access control policies in
AND gate. Algorithms in [43] and [44] improved the efficiency
of [42], and achieved hidden policies. The length of ciphertext
stayed constant in [44]. However, policies realized by AND
gate only support an AND operation between attributes. Thus,
[45] and [46] constructed access policy with a tree structure
in a more flexible way. The algorithm in [40] used LSSS
access structure to represent access policies, but the time cost
of encryption and decryption was increased linearly with the
complexity of access structure.
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Fig. 1. Problem Description.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
This section introduces essential elements of the proposed
SCTSC mode. Construction of the proposed method is pro-
vided in next section.
A. Problem Description
Figure 1 gives a simple example of the problem. The road
is an example of driving on the right.
Alice drives into the History Road from north to south. The
traffic light in front of her is red. However, no vehicles are
driving in the approach lane of Fifth Avenue and Six Avenue.
So, all vehicles waiting at approach lanes of History Road and
Future Road waste their time. The traffic efficiency has vast
potential to be increased. Moreover, if Alice is in a hurry (e.g.,
she has to drive to the hospital with her sick child), it is better
for her to pass through the low traffic flow intersection as soon
as possible.
A possible solution is to devolution the power of signal
control to vehicles. Giving vehicles rights to determine the
next direction and order of traffic is a good choice. Thus, a
method of control-by-vehicles is used.
B. Attribute based Blockchain
This part discusses a novel blockchain structure, which
attaches the goal of fine-grained access control on data.
1) Block and Chain Structure: As is used in Bitcoin and
other similar projects, block structure is divided into two parts,
a block header and a main block. A block header contains
a unique index to distinguish each block, in which a hash
function is commonly used. A main block is used to record
some significant information (e.g., transactions) of a project.
For a block structure of an attribute-based blockchain, we
retain some necessary fields described above, and a new
structure is shown in Table I.
A chain consists of a series of ordered and deterministic
blocks. Based on the block structure above, each new block is
related to its previous block. Any modification to a previous
block leads to a change of its hash value. All following blocks
are influenced as well. Thus, the blockchain is tamper resistant.
TABLE I
BLOCK STRUCTURE
Parts Fields Areas
Block Header a block index
a previous block hash
a timestamp
a signature
Main Block several message fields message content
related information
2) Nodes and Attributes: In general, users or infrastructures
can be seen as nodes. Drivers draft temporary agreements to
save their time. Infrastructures (e.g., traffic signal controllers)
are also able to draft temporary agreements to improve traffic
efficiency. There are two kinds of nodes in the blockchain,
simple nodes and consensus nodes. Simple nodes have rights
to read and generate new messages. However, they have no
right to write messages into a blockchain directly. Consensus
nodes take part in the process of consensus and have the right
to read and write messages into a blockchain. However, they
have no right to generate new messages. It is important to be
aware that, in some cases, a node plays a role of both simple
node and consensus node.
A node in attribute-based blockchain is identified not only
by its anonymous identity (e.g., pseudonym) but also by a set
of fuzzy identities (e.g., locations). Both anonymous identities
and fuzzy identities are attributes.
As shown in Figure 1, each driver is a node. An attribute
set of a node contains a pseudonym, a current location and
a direction, for example, {April, History Road, north-south}
for Alice. If Alice wants to control the traffic light signal only
for the drivers in the same lane, she needs to encrypt and
broadcast a message with an access policy {History Road and
north-south}, instead of sending different encrypted messages
to different drivers separately. Moreover, the privacy of a
broadcast message and the related users should be protected.
Using attributes as essential characteristics give the
blockchain a dynamic fine-grained access control on data.
Nodes whose attribute set satisfied the same access policy are
grouped (e.g., Alice, Catherine and Tim are in the same group).
Interactions among them are recorded on the blockchain along
with other groups’ interactions through CP-ABE. However,
nodes that are outside the group are not able to decrypt
the encrypted interaction messages of this group since the
access policy is not satisfied (e.g., Bob cannot read encrypted
messages in Alice’s group). Thus, the privacy is preserved in
a group.
If the strict supervision is necessary for blockchain, mes-
sages that are not readable to consensus nodes will be dis-
carded. If privacy needs more consideration than supervision,
consensus nodes can input all messages into consensus algo-
rithm blindly without knowing anything about contents.
From another point of view, attributes are able to divide into
two groups.
• Static attributes: Entities’ inherent features are static
attributes. For example, a vehicle’s engine number is a
static attribute. Moreover, a person’s name is used as a
static attribute as well, since it is less likely to be changed
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Fig. 2. General information stream in SCTSC mode.
in a short period. However, if privacy is more concerned,
we should be cautious of using such static attributes. For
CP-ABE, some parts of a private key that are related to
static attributes do not need to be frequently updated.
Thus, key distribution costs are reduced.
• Dynamic attributes: Frequently modified attributes are
dynamic attributes. For example, the location information
is a dynamic attribute, since it will change with moving
car. For CP-ABE, some parts of a private key that
are related to dynamic attributes need to be frequently
updated.
C. Roles
Different roles used in SCTSC mode are introduced in this
part. Figure 2 shows a general information stream in SCTSC
mode.
Proposer: A proposer is an initiator of an agreement, who is
responsible for drafting an agreement and organizing a proper
voting group for the agreement. When voting is finished, a
proposer is in charge of vote counting. A user is allowed to acts
as different proposers in different voting groups. A proposer
is a simple node in the attribute-based blockchain.
Voter: A voter replies to an agreement and votes for it.
A user is allowed to acts as different voters in different
voting groups. A voter is a simple node in the attribute-based
blockchain.
Voting Group: Each agreement is related to a specific
voting group. A voting group contains a proposer and several
voters who are selected by the proposer with the help of access
policies (a combination of attributes).
Recorder: A recorder has the right to read and write a
blockchain. Besides, a recorder does not know real identities
of proposers and voters, except for communication channels.
In a voting group, a role of recorder must be different from
proposers and voters. A recorder is a consensus node in an
attribute-based blockchain. For example, drivers are proposers
and voters, while infrastructures are recorders.
User: Proposers, voters, and recorders are called users. A
user is allowed to read messages from a blockchain at any
time. When joining SCTSC mode, a new user must request an
Authentication Center to perform an authentication operation.
A user can be a driver, a vehicle sensor or an infrastructure.
Authentication Center: An Authentication Center verifies
users’ real identities, gives attribute sets, distributes key pairs
for signature, and distributes private keys for decryption to
users. However, a center does not reject a user for any other
reasons, such as the limitation on the number of participants.
So, the proposed method is considered to be semi-centralized.
Meanwhile, a user’s pseudonym and signature public key
are published to all users. A user is allowed to apply new
signature key pair and the private encryption key with different
pseudonyms, to guarantee long-term anonymous.
Trace Manager: A Trace Manager takes charge of trac-
ing malicious participants or fraudulent messages. A Trace
Manager gets fraudulent records from a blockchain and gets
a malicious user’s real identity by querying a pseudonym in
an Authentication Center. The Trace Manager is secure and
reliable.
System: A system is an environment in which the SCTSC
mode is operated. It is generally considered as trustworthy and
secure.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The novel mode is based on the method of control-by-
vehicles. Vehicles driven in the same road and the same
direction are grouped together. They get their keys from the
Authority Center for the new group. The proposer sends a
signal control message to voters in the group without the
knowledge of the identities of the voters. Voters reply to the
message to show their standpoints with pseudonyms and the
fresh nonce in that message. The proposer collects the voters
reply and make the final decision. All the messages, replies,
and decisions are recorded on the blockchain. Vehicles do
not communicate with each other directly while through the
blockchain.
A. Basic Method
Security parameter: λ is a general security parameter, and
κ is the security parameter used in attributed based encryption
(briefly, bilinear group size).
Hash function: Choosing a collision resistance hash func-
tion for SCTSC mode with the form CRH : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}O(λ).
Statistically hiding commitment: Choosing a statistically
hiding commitment for SCTSC mode with the form
{COMMs : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}O(λ)}s, in which s is the secret
value of the commitment.
Digital Signature: Choosing a digital signature algorithm
as follows,
Sig = (Setupsig,Keygensig, Signsig, V erifysig):
• Setupsig(1λ) → ppsig: Giving a security parameter λ,
Setupsig generates a public parameter ppsig .
• Keygensig(ppsig) → (pksig, sksig): Giving a public
parameter ppsig , Keygensig generates a pair of keys
(pksig, sksig) used to sign a message.
• Signsig(sksig,m) → σ: Giving secret key sksig and
message m, Signsig generates a signature σ to message
m.
• V erifysig(pksig,m, σ)→ b: Giving a public key pksig ,
a message m and a signature σ, V erifysig verifies the
relationship between message m and signature σ. If σ is
the signature of the message m, b = 1. Or else, b = 0.
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Ciphertext Policy Attribute based Encryption: Choosing
a CP-ABE as follows,
Att = (Setupatt,Keygenatt, Encatt, Decatt):
• Setupatt(1λ)→ (PK,MK): Giving a security parame-
ter λ, Setupatt generates a public key PK and a master
secret key MK.
• Keygenatt(MK,S)→ SK: Giving a master secret key
MK and an attribute set S, Keygenatt generates a set
of secret key SK based on attributes S.
• Encatt(PK,M, T ) → CT : Giving a public key PK,
message m and an access tree T , Encatt generates a
ciphertext CT .
• Decatt(CT, SK) → M : Giving a ciphertext CT and
the corresponding secret key SK, Decatt decrypts the
ciphertext and gets the plaintext M .
B. General Method
A setup phase is operated at the beginning of SCTSC
mode. Then, users communicate with each other according
to different phases. As shown in Figure. 3, there are four
kinds of phases for a temporary agreement round. For a whole
system, the agreement rounds are executed concurrently while
the consistency is controlled by recorders through consensus
algorithm. Processes in full line are operated in a sequential
execution. The first group of processes in full line represents
a drafting phase. The second group of processes in full line
represents a reply phase. The third group of processes in full
line represents a decision phase. Each group of processes
in dashed line represents verification phase, which can be
operated at any time.
Fig. 3. Processes of SCTSC mode for a single agreement round.
1) Setup Phase: To install a SCTSC mode in a real situa-
tion, public parameters are generated in setup phase as shown
in Algorithm 1. However, in an experimental environment,
tasks of attribute distribution and key distribution are also
taken during the setup phase, which is shown in Algorithm
2. Verification of a user’s identity is also done in this phase.
A secret key for CP-ABE and a key pair for signature are
generated and distributed. Moreover, an attribute set of the
system is updated due to new attributes of a new user.
Although the system’s new attribute set is frequently up-
dated in real time, users do not need to download the set in
Algorithm 1 Setup Phase in real.
Input: security parameter λ; security parameter κ; a set of
attributes about road att[ ];
Output: public key for CP-ABE PK, master secret key
for CP-ABE MK, system’s initial attribute set Ssystem,
public parameter ppsig
1: function SETUPPHASEREAL(λ, κ)
2: (PK,MK)← Setupatt(1λ)
3: Ssystem ← att[ ]
4: ppsig ← Setupsig(1κ)
5: return PK,MK,Ssystem, ppsig
6: end function
Algorithm 2 Setup Phase for each user.
Input: master secret key for CP-ABE, MK; system’s initial
attribute set, Ssystem; user’s real identity, id; pseudonym,
pse; user’s attribute set, Suser[ ]; public parameter, ppsig;
using ∗ to represent all inputs above;
Output: system’s new attribute set Ssystem, secret key for
CP-ABE SK, keys for signature (pksig, sksig)
1: function SETUPPHASEUSER(∗)
2: Ssystem ← Ssystem + Suser[ ]
3: SK ← Keygenatt(MK,Ssystem)
4: if id is verified and pse is unique then
5: (pksig, sksig)← Keygensig(ppsig, pse)
6: end if
7: return Ssystem, SK, pksig, sksig
8: end function
each time, since users are able to get attributes about location
information from outside environments (e.g., road names and
directions). Pseudonyms are useless in the construction of
access policies during encryption.
2) drafting phase: In drafting phase, a proposer P drafts
a new agreement for a group of voters, as the process of I-1
and I-2 in Figure. 3.
Choosing a proper voting group is needed to be considered
first. A proposer does not choose voters by their identities
or their pseudonyms, instead by attributes. So, a proposer
does not need to communicate with others beforehand; this
decreases the communication cost and keeps voters anony-
mous in this phase. A proposer chooses enough attributes to
construct an access policy which is only satisfied by potential
voters. The access policy is organized in the tree structure
(e.g., access tree in [45]).
Each agreement needs a fixed number (i.e., threshold value)
of voters to give affirmative votes. The threshold value should
be decided at the drafting phase and stay unchangeable in
the following phases. Otherwise, a malicious proposer is able
to change the threshold value into a different value, which
may disturb the mode. So, a commitment to the threshold
value is required. A proposer chooses a secret value s for
threshold value t (called affirmative votes amount) and com-
putes COMMs(t) as a commitment to t. The commitment is
published in this phase, while secret value s and threshold
value t are kept without leakage until the decision phase
completes. In decision phase, both of values are disclosed.
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Algorithm 3 Drafting Phase.
Input: public key for CP-ABE, PK; system’s attribute set,
Ssystem; a new agreement, agreement; proposer’s secret
key of signature, sksig,P ; the number of affirmative vote,
t; using ∗ to represent all inputs above;
Output: a new agreement record AgreementRecord;
1: function DRAFTINGPHASE(∗)
2: choose Sdra ∈ Ssystem or choose Sdra from outside
environment
3: T ← Sdra
4: nonce← Random()
5: protext← agreement+ nonce
6: CTprotext ← Encatt(PK, protext, T )
7: s← Random()
8: COMMs(t)← COMM(t, s)
9: timestamp← System.time()
10: hAR ← HASH(CTprotext + COMMs(t) +
timestamp)
11: σP ← Signsig(sksig,P , hAR)
12: AgreementRecord ← hAR + CTprotext +
COMMs(t) + timestamp+ σP
13: return AgreementRecord;
14: end function
Users are able to verify the two value after the decision
phase, to make sure that the threshold value is the initial one
committed in the drafting phase. But no one is able to get
the threshold value before the decision phase, except for the
proposer.
Another important issue is the method to distinguish valid
voters and pretended voters. Obviously, only valid voters in a
voting group have the right to vote on the related agreement. A
voter has to give an evidence to a proposer, which indicates the
fact that the voter’s attribute set satisfies the access policy. So,
a fresh nonce encrypted with the access policy is needed. The
nonce is generated for each agreement randomly and uniquely.
So, only valid voters are able to get a valid nonce. Pretended
voters are difficult to predict or guess the nonce.
A timestamp is needed. An index is given to each agreement
to identify an agreement more simply. Moreover, a signature
of proposer is used for responsibility investigation. As shown
in Algorithm 3, this phase outputs a new agreement record.
A proposer sends AgreementRecord to a recorder. Recorder
packs the record into a new block and adds the block into
the blockchain via a cooperation consensus algorithm among
recorders.
3) Reply Phase: In reply phase, a voter V reads agreements
from the blockchain, as the process of II-1 in Figure. 3. An
access tree of each agreement is checked by the voter. If the
access tree is satisfied by the voter’s attribute set, the voter
needs to vote on the agreement, as the process of III-2 in
Figure. 3.
For such an agreement, the voter verifies signatures of the
related block and the AgreementRecord. The content of the
agreement and nonce are gotten after decrypting the ciphertext
in AgreementRecord. Then, the voter decides whether to vote.
An action of voting represents an affirmative vote. An action
Algorithm 4 Reply Phase.
Input: public key for CP-ABE, PK; an agreement record,
AgreementRecord; voter’s secret key of signature,
sksig,V ; proposer’s public key of signature, pksig,P ;
voter’s secret key for CP-ABE, SKV ; system’s attribute
set, Ssystem; voter’s pseudonym, pseV ; using ∗ to repre-
sent all inputs above;
Output: a new reply record ReplyRecord;
1: function REPLYPHASE(∗)
2: (hAR, CTprotext, COMMs(t), timestamp, σP ) ←
AgreementRecord
3: h← HASH(CTprotext+COMMs(t)+timestamp)
4: if h == hAR then
5: b← V erifysig(pksig,P , h, σP )
6: if b is true then
7: M ← Decatt(CTprotext, SKV )
8: (agreement, nonce)←M
9: choose Srep ∈ Ssystem or choose Srep from
outside environment
10: Trep ← Srep
11: reptext = nonce+ pseV
12: CTreptext ← Encatt(PK, reptext, Trep)
13: if agree with the agreement then
14: vote← Random()
15: timestamp← System.time()
16: hPR ← HASH(hAR+CTreptext+vote+
timestamp)
17: σV ← Signsig(sksig,V , hPR)
18: ReplyRecord← hPR+hAR+CTreptext+
vote+ timestamp+ σV
19: return ReplyRecord
20: end if
21: end if
22: end if
23: end function
of ignoring represents a dissenting vote. If the voter is for
the agreement, a reply is needed. Otherwise, the voter does
nothing.
A ciphertext of a concatenation string (reptext :=
{nonce||pse}) is used in reply. Thus, a pretended voter (i.e.,
malicious voter) cannot disturb the agreement round with
a correct nonce unless the nonce is leaked by voters. A
timestamp, signature and hash index are also needed in this
phase. The reply phase is showed as Algorithm 4.
A voter sends his or her ReplyRecord to a recorder.
Recorder packets the record and adds the new block into the
blockchain by cooperation consensus algorithm, as the process
of III-3 in Figure. 3.
4) Decision Phase: In decision phase, a proposer collects
all ReplyRecords related to the agreement, as the process
of III-1 in Figure. 3. The signatures are verified first. Then,
the proposer decrypts ciphertext of each ReplyRecord and
gets a set of reptext. For each ReplyRecord, the proposer
checks the pseudonym in reptext and the pseudonym in
signature. If these pseudonyms are one-to-one correspondence,
the proposer checks uniqueness of pseudonyms among all Re-
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Algorithm 5 Decision Phase.
Input: public key for CP-ABE, PK; a set of reply records,
ReplyRecord[ ]; proposer’s secret key of signature,
sksig,P ; related voters’ public key of ssignature, pksig,V [ ];
proposer’s secret key for CP-ABE, SKP ; the nonce of the
related agreement, nonce; the secret value of the related
agreement, s; the threshold value of the related agreement,
t; using ∗ to represent all inputs above;
Output: a new decision record DecisionRecord;
1: function DECISIONPHASE(∗)
2: for i = 0→ ReplyRecord[ ].size− 1 do
3: (hPR,i, hAR,i, CTreptext,i, votei, timestampi, σV,i)
← ReplyRecord[i]
4: hi ← HASH(hAR,i + CTreptext,i + votei +
timestampi)
5: if hi == hPR,i then
6: bi ← V erifysig(pksig,V,i, hi, σV,i)
7: if bi is true then
8: Mi ← Decatt(CTreptext,i, SKP )
9: (pseV,i, noncei)←Mi
10: if noncei == nonce and pseV,i equals to
the pse in pksig,V,i and pseV,i is not repetitive then
11: listRP+ = ReplyRecord[i]
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
16: t
′ ← listRP .size()
17: timestamp← System.time()
18: hDR ← HASH(hAR + listRP + s + t + t′ +
timestamp)
19: σP ← Signsig(sksig,P , hDR)
20: DecisionRecord = hDR + hAR + listRP + s + t +
t
′
+ timestamp+ σP
21: return DecisionRecord
22: end function
plyRecords. The proposer discards all repetitive ReplyRecords
and reserves the first one. So, the selected set of ReplyRecords
contains affirmative votes from different voters without repe-
tition.
The proposer counts the number of affirmative votes. If the
number does not reach the expected threshold value t, the
proposer keeps on collecting until the goal is achieved or
time is run out. Otherwise, the proposer writes all indexes
of affirmative votes into a new list listRP . Meanwhile, the
proposer publishes the secret value s and threshold value t.
Hash indexes, number of affirmative votes t
′
, a timestamp,
and a signature are also needed in this phase. The decision
phase is shown as Algorithm 5.
A proposer sends DecisionRecord to a recorder, as the
process of III-2 in Figure. 3. Recorder packets the record
into a new block and adds the block into the blockchain by
cooperation consensus algorithm, as the process of III-3 in
Figure. 3.
5) Verification Phase: In verification phase, users verify
the process from drafting phase to decision phase for an
agreement. Different records are related by hAR, hRR, hDR
and listRP . So, users are able to find all corresponding records
easily.
6) Signal Control: A passed agreement with the most
affirmative votes is considered first in a signalized intersection.
And the related lane has priority of starting.
However, the real situation is more complicated because of
different types of traffic lanes. A signalized intersection with
only straight lane and four approach lanes is the simplest case.
Let us explain how our proposed method works in general
scenarios based on this simple case.
If there are more than two passed agreements for the
same road and the same direction, the agreement with a
larger number of affirmative votes is accepted. Assuming an
intersection has four approach lanes, so there will be up to four
kinds of passed agreements at the same time with affirmative
votes number of t
′
north−south, t
′
south−north, t
′
east−west, and
t
′
west−east. These four passed agreements are divided into two
groups, a NS-group {t′north−south, t
′
south−north} and a WE-
group {t′east−west, t
′
west−east}, based on the conflict approach
lanes. Thus, new affirmative votes number of NS-group and
WE-group are t
′
ns = t
′
north−south + t
′
south−north and t
′
we =
t
′
east−west + t
′
west−east. The group that has larger affirmative
votes number has the priority of starting. If both the two values
are equal, traffic lights follow the current fixed cycle length
of signal control.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION
In this section, we first discuss several important security
issues in SCTSC mode. Then, time cost consideration is
analyzed by game theory method. Finally, the experiment
result is given.
A. Security Analysis
Anonymity: Records saved on the attribute-based
blockchain do not contain users’ identities. Thus, group
members and the public do not know the others’ identities.
Users’ real identities are only known to the Authentication
Center. Publishing a user’s identity to the Authentication
Center is necessary since the Authentication Center needs to
distribute proper encryption and signature key pairs to users.
The Authentication Center gives a user some attributes by a
user’s real identity. Although a signature key pair is related
to a user’s pseudonym, a user does not need to worry about
anonymity too much. A user is able to apply a new key pair
at any time with a different pseudonym. However, for the
whole scheme, each pseudonym should be unique. If a user
changes his or her pseudonym frequently, it is tough for an
adversary to trace the user’s records and relate the pseudonym
with a real person.
Untraceability: Assuming a malicious user Malice has
already found a record a of a real person Alice on the
blockchain, Malice wants to find another record of Alice on
the blockchain. Since Malice knows the record a, he is able
to get the corresponding pseudonym in the record. Records
signed with the same pseudonym on the blockchain are easy
to find. However, records signed by Alice but with a different
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pseudonym are not able to be recognized. Because for all
data recorded on the blockchain, there is no evidence to
support the relationship between two pseudonyms unless Alice
gives her pseudonyms of some relations. If Alice changes her
pseudonym after each record she sends, Malice can get nothing
except the current record.
Man-in-Middle Attack Resistance: Assuming a malicious
user Malice is listening between a proposer Alice and a
voter Bob, he tries to tamper the records sent by Alice and
Bob. If Malice modifies any field of records, the hash value
will be changed, and the corresponding signature will not
be correct anymore. So, Malice needs to forge a signature
for the modification. However, the private key of signature
is only known to the user and the Authentication Center
which is considered to be trusted. Malice cannot create a
new valid signature of Alice or Bob for his modification. Any
modification without a valid signature can be easily identified
by both Alice and Bob, even other users who do not know the
real contents.
Reply Attack Resistance: Records published on the
blockchain have two fields, hash index, and timestamp. Hash
index is computed from the whole record except the signature.
Different records have different hash index values generally
since we have already known that hash collision appears with
low probability. A timestamp is a field used to store the
creation time of a record. A recently created record has an
absolute fresh timestamp. Records are able to be divided into
many agreement rounds. A reply attack to those agreement
rounds that have already been finished has less meaning since
the decision has already been made and no records will be
considered by the voting group anymore. So, if a malicious
user Malice tries to launch a reply attack in the scheme with
potential malicious effect, he should attack those agreement
rounds that are running in reply phase, or tries to start a new
agreement round with an old AgreementRecord. Assuming
Alice is a proposer of a voting group, and Bob is a voter
in the same voting group. For the first kind of attack, Malice
has to copy the ReplyRecord of Bob and send to a recorder.
Since repetitive ReplyRcords are rejected by proposers, a reply
attack on ReplyRecord does not work. For the second attack,
Malice has to copy the AgreementRecord of Alice and send
to a recorder. Voters, like Bob, will not reply to the agreement
since he has already reply an agreement with the same hash
index.
Fine-grained Access Control: Only a few of data recorded
on the blockchain is readable to all users. Sensitive data is
encrypted with CP-ABE. Only a user whose attribute set
satisfies the access policy of the ciphertext is able to decrypt
it. So, fine-grained access control is inherently realized. Users
record their data on the blockchain together, but only the data
belongs to his or her is able to be visited.
Non-repudiation: A signature is contained in each record
and a block. In the consensus process, recorders check the
signature of each record. Those records with invalid signature
are denied by recorders. The records saved on the blockchain
cannot be modified, since the tamper-resistant feature of the
blockchain. Each record of an agreement round is recorded
honestly and integrated on the blockchain. A whole process
of an agreement round is able to be reconstructed based on
these records. Thus, SCTSC mode is non-repudiation.
Sybil Attack Detectable: Among all anonymous voting
schemes, it is difficult to trace real identities in anonymous
phases, which leads to the chances of launching Sybil attacks.
With the help of blockchain and the inherent feature of
unmodifiable, all operations of anonymous identities and the
corresponding records are saved on the blockchain and stayed
unchangeable. If a malicious voter votes twice for a single
agreement with different anonymous identities gotten from
the Authentication Center, a Trace Manager are able to trace
the malicious voter with the assistance of the Authentication
Center. A severe punishment is excepted. Several restrictions
or modifications on SCTSC mode are also able to deal with
the Sybil attack in a similar way. For example, restricting the
Authentication Center to authenticate only ten pseudonyms
for each real identity at the same time, and let the later
authentication apply covers the old ones. So, the anonymous
identities of each person are limited. If the limitation on the
minimum number of affirmative votes (larger or much larger
than ten) is also set, a single or a small group of malicious
voters are difficult to launch a successful Sybil attack.
B. Time Cost Consideration
An essential link in supporting the SCTSC mode is actively
voting. That is, the final result should have almost the same
percentage of affirmative votes as the voters’ real thought. The
most common way of dealing with this problem is through
incentives. An incentive mechanism encourages participants
by giving rewards. In SCTSC mode, an incentive mechanism
is contained inherently, called travel time cost. We analysis
the mechanism in a game theory model.
Assuming Alice and Bob are two voters in the same voting
group in SCTSC mode, they agree with the same agreement.
In reply phase, both of them have two choices. One is to reply
honestly. That is, Alice or Bob votes an affirmative vote for
the agreement. We called this behavior as to vote. Another one
is to reply negatively. In other words, Alice or Bob stays in
silence. We called this behavior as not to vote. A vote action
leads to the cost of interaction time since a voter need to
receive and send messages. A passed agreement saves the cost
of travel time to voters, since the traffic light turns green as
long as voters arrive at the intersection. We define interaction
time as µ(µ > 0) and travel time as ω(ω > µ > 0).
Alice and Bob do not know each other’s choice while they
vote for an agreement. Assuming that if both Alice and Bob
vote affirmative votes, the agreement is passed. The time cost
is µ−ω, since they save the cost of travel time by paying out
an interaction time. If Alice and Bob do not choose to vote,
the agreement is failed. The time cost is 0. If one of them
gives an affirmative vote, the agreement is passed. The time
cost is µ− ω and −ω respectively.
Base on the above assumptions, we have the description in
Table II. The horizontal line of to vote and not to vote are
Bob’s choices, and the vertical line of to vote and not to vote
are Alice’s choices. In each grid, the first equation is Alice’s
time cost, and the second equation is Bob’s time cost.
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TABLE II
TIME COST CONSIDERATION
to vote not to vote
to vote µ− ω, µ− ω µ− ω,−ω
not to vote −ω, µ− ω 0, 0
Fig. 4. Time consumption in CP-ABE encryption with different access tree
depth.
There is no dominant strategy in Table II. If Alice thinks
that Bob will choose to vote, Alice will choose not to vote. If
Alice thinks Bob will choose not to vote, Alice will choose to
vote. So, Alice’s choice is different based on Bob’s choice.
However, as we have assumed, Alice does not know Bob’s
choice. Her guesses may lead her into a worse situation. For
example, Alice guesses Bob will choose to vote, and she
chooses not to vote. However, Bob has the same train of
thought with Alice, and he chooses not to vote. In the end,
both Alice and Bob will get nothing. So, when considering the
rewards of both choices, to vote is the best strategy for Alice.
Because no matter what Bob chooses, Alice does not need to
worry about getting 0. Also, the similar scenario applies to
Bob.
One efficient way to enhance the best strategy is to widening
the gap between interaction cost µ and travel cost ω. If
interaction cost µ is far lower than travel cost ω, there is no
difference between choosing µ−ω and −ω. However, the risk
of choosing not to vote becomes more considerable.
C. Experiment Analysis
We use the elliptic curve in our program to construct
bilinear pairs. We develop local operations of each phase
with the help of library bcprov-jdk15on-158, commons-codec-
1.7, jpbc-api-1.2.1, jpbc-plaf-1.2.1 and libbswabe-0.9 on Java
Runtime Environment 1.8 with an Intel Core i5-2400 CPU.
Since the encryption of an agreement is related to an
access tree, the relationship between encryption time and
access policy complexity needs to be considered. Let each
parent node have two child nodes, the relationship between
encryption time and access tree depth is shown in Figure 4.
For example, the access tree depth of a policy {Sixth Avenue
or Fifth Avenue} is two, and the access tree depth of a policy
{(Sixth Avenue and west-east) or (Fifth Avenue and east-west)}
is three. From Figure 4, we find that the encryption time
increases with the depth of the access tree. Let the access
tree depth be four, the relationship between encryption time
Fig. 5. Time consumption in CP-ABE encryption with different attribute
complexity.
Fig. 6. Time consumption for each phase in SCTSC mode.
TABLE III
AVERAGE TIME CONSUMPTION IN SCTSC MODE.
Phase Time Consumption (ms)
Setup Phase 46.89
Drafting phase 210.30
Reply Phase 60.93
Decision Phase 19.47
and attribute complexity is shown in Figure 5. We define
attribute complexity as the number of child nodes for each
non-leaf node. But, if each non-leaf node only has one child
node, an access tree with depth of four is meaningless. From
Figure 5, we know that encryption time increases with attribute
complexity.
The SCTSC mode is controlled by vehicles. As discussed in
the problem description, the novel mode is efficient when the
traffic of the road is not heavy. If the traffic of the road is heavy
and there are too many cars driven in different directions, this
kind of controlled-by-vehicles mode may cause conflict and
disorder. If the road is in a rush hour, the signal controller is
suggested to turn back to a pre-timed mode or other similar
fixed modes, since the mode change operation exists in most of
the modern traffic signal controllers. Thus, in order to simulate
a non traffic-heavy road, we choose to set a small number of
vehicles.
To simplify the experiment, we assume each voting group
has five voters. The result of the experiment does not contain
consensus and message transmission time since the time is
depended mainly on the network environment.
The average time of setup phase is 46.89ms, as shown in
Table III and Figure 6. In setup phase, the system generates
public key and master secret key for CP-ABE, registers new
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Fig. 7. Idea time cost in real situation.
users and distributes secret key for CP-ABE and key pairs
for signature. In the experiment, we run the above processes
step by step and record the operation time. However, in a
real situation, the above processes are operated separately. For
example, the system generates public key and master secret
key for CP-ABE at the beginning. When a new user applies
for registration, the next two steps are operated. When an old
user wants to use a new pseudonym or change attributes, the
system runs some part of the last two steps. So, in a real
situation, setup phase is able to have less time cost. And the
operations are able to become more dispersion.
The average time of drafting phase is 210.30ms, as shown in
Table III and Figure 6. In drafting phase, encryption occupies
a large portion of time cost, which depends on the complexity
of an access tree. An access tree with deeper depth and wider
breadth leads to more time cost of encryption. However, in a
real situation, drafting phase is able to be operated previously,
since this phase does not contain any interaction. A proposer
is able to finish all computing locally.
The average time of reply phase is 60.93ms, as shown in
Table III and Figure 6. In reply phase, five voters reply to the
same agreement. However, because of time delay and other
reasons of the network environment, in a real situation, the
time cost of reply phase should be more than the experiment
average time cost.
The average time of decision phase is 19.47ms, as shown in
Table III and Figure 6. In decision phase, a proposer collects
affirmative votes and makes a decision. In our experiment, the
operations start from the beginning of this phase. However,
in a real situation, some of the operations are able to start as
long as a ReplyRecord is received. For example, a proposer
decrypts the first vote while waiting for the second vote.
Considering the real situation described above, Figure 7
shows the idea time cost in a real situation. In Figure 7, there
are three types of time. Time consumption is the experiment
result shown above. The time delay is a total of consensus time
(92.4ms, as simulated in [26]) and a desired average delay of
the network (30ms). Overall time represents other kinds of
delay, such as a delay caused by operation exception.
D. Applicable Scene
In the existing pre-timed mode, the signal cycle consists
of a set of fixed value. If the traffic has some sudden change,
the pre-timed mode needs human control to change the signal.
Obviously, for a modern metropolis, it is difficult to reach the
goal without delay. Comparing with the pre-timed mode, the
SCTSC mode could adjust the signal cycle dynamically. And
the novel mode reduces the burden of the management center.
In the existing sensor-based mode, signal control relies
on sensor sensitivity. Photoelectric sensors are susceptible to
the weather, while pressure sensors are easily damaged by
overloaded vehicles. Comparing with the sensor-based mode,
the SCTSC mode is not affected by the weather, and the
maintenance was spread out among the vehicles, which is more
efficient.
The limitations are not severe to the role assignment or
amounts, since all kinds of vehicles may have an emergency.
But the signal controller must be contained in the groups
around the intersection, since the signal controller must know
the decision and executes the signal change. The public
infrastructure (e.g., signal controllers or smart parking charge
units, the same as the notion of roadside units in VANET)
controlled by the traffic management department is suggested
to be set as recorders, since the growth of the blockchain
should be stable.
As discussed in the section above, the SCTSC mode is
especially efficient for a not heavy road. For a road with
heavy traffic, this kind of controlled-by-vehicles mode may
generate frequent orders to the controller. So, it is difficult for
the controllers to change the signal. In this case, the signal
controller is suggested to turn back to a pre-timed mode or
other similar fixed modes, since the average waiting time stays
almost the same.
For a pretty long road, some vehicles (e.g., a vehicle has just
driven into the road) may not pass through the intersection in
time. There are three kinds of solutions to solve the problem.
The first one is to propose the signal change agreement in a
proper time (e.g., when the vehicle is driven into the middle of
the road). The second one is to propose a new signal change
agreement to extend the time of passing if the vehicle is in an
emergency. The third one is to change the passing time of the
intersection into a more proper value in order to give vehicles
enough time to pass through the road and the intersection.
Generally, in main urban areas of cities, drivers cannot drive
their vehicles fast due to the reason of traffic congestion and
speed limitations (e.g., 50 kilometers per hour in China and
15 miles per hour in New York City). Let the ideal time cost
of an agreement be 600 ms. A decision is able to reach during
vehicle travel of fewer than 10 meters. We randomly measured
the length of more than 200 roads with signalized intersections
in the main urban area of Beijing. The result shows that the
average road length between two signalized intersections is
around 383 meters. A decision is reachable on the average
road length. So, the proposed SCTSC mode is efficient and
practical in a real situation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a novel semi-centralized traffic
signal control mode (SCTSC mode) for signalized intersection
with attribute based blockchain in IoVs. Combining CP-ABE
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with blockchain technology, the protection of messages and
users’ identities are achieved while ensuring public verification
and responsibility investigation. Through extensive experi-
ments, the total time cost of local operations in SCTSC mode
is 290.70 ms. However, with a pre-execution of drafting phase,
the local operation time decreases to 80.40 ms. To conclude,
SCTSC mode is practical for signalized intersection in the
scenario of IoVs.
In future work, we plan to decrease the interactions and
encryption cost in SCTSC mode. Designing more effective
modes or protocols is also being investigated.
APPENDIX A
A CONCRETE INSTANTIATION OF SCTSC MODE
A. COMM and CRH from Hash
We instantiate COMM and CRH via SHA256. That is,
COMMs(t) = SHA256(s||t), and CRH as SHA256(∗) for
∗ ∈ {0, 1}512.
B. Sig from SM2
For digital signature, we use SM2 to realize a secure and
efficient signature based on ECC.
C. CP-ABE from BSWABE
On the construction of SCTSC mode, the attribute-based
encryption method in [45] is used, since the original method
is applied to most of demands of SCTSC mode.
System initializes an attribute set S for all users’ attributes.
Then, system chooses bilinear group G0, G1, and bilinear
mapping e : G0 ×G0 → G1, while G0 has an order p and a
generator g.
Att = (Setupatt,Keygenatt, Encatt, Decatt):
• Setupatt(1λ) → (PK,MK): Choosing α, β ∈ Zp
randomly to get both PK = (G0, g, h = gβ , e(g, g)α)
and MK = (β, gα).PK is published. MK is kept secret.
• Keygenatt(MK,S)→ SK: Let S be an attribute set of
a user. Choosing ξ ∈ Zp and ξj ∈ Zp(j ∈ S) randomly,
SK = (D = g(α+ξ)/β , Dj = g
ξH(j)ξj , D′j = g
ξj , j ∈
S). SK is distributed to a related user.
• Encatt(PK,M, T ) → CT : Let Y represents the
leaf node set of the access tree T , CT =
(T, C˜ = Me(g, g)αρ, C = hρ, Cy = g
fy(0), C ′y =
H(att(y))fy(0), y ∈ Y ), while att(y) is an attribute
related to a node y.
• Decatt(CT, SK) → M : Let ζ be a node in the access
tree T . And,
DecryptNode(CT, SK, ζ)
=

e(Di, Cζ)
e(D′i, C
′
ζ)
= e(g, g)ξfζ(0), i ∈ SV
⊥, i /∈ S
(1)
For each child node z of a non-leaf node ζ, let Fz =
DecryptNode(CT, SK, z). Let Sζ be a set with size kζ
at node ζ, and have Fz 6= ⊥ for each child node z. If
any set described above does not exist, the process of
decryption is stopped. Or else,
Fζ =
∏
z∈Sζ
F
4i,S′
ζ
(0)
z = e(g, g)
ξfζ(0) (2)
where,
i = index(z) (3)
S′ζ = {index(z) : z ∈ Sζ} (4)
4i,S′ζ (x) =
∏
j∈S′ζ ,j 6=i
x− j
i− j (5)
If a user’s attribute set S satisfy access tree T , the user
is able to get M as follows,
A = DecryptNode(CT, SK, %)
= e(g, g)ξf%(0) = e(g, g)ξρ
(6)
M =
C˜
e(C,D)/A
(7)
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